Round Table Discussions
Discussions at the Round Table are for educational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice. It is a way to do research and get several points of view about the United States judicial system. This is a role playing discussion and debate group and forum.
Kudzu Jungle’s Round Table group, forum, discussions and debates are open to Subscribers. Prerequisite is to first create a free account, complete the Start Up Guide, and then you’ll be eligible to become a Subscriber ($15 / yr). This gives you access to the Round Table.
You can advocate for the court, the plaintiffs, the defendants, or you can introduce another angle, such as role playing as a mock judge in the Appeals Court, or an organization. Another role you could play is to argue as though you are defending the intent of a law, a case or a rule.
JUNE, 2026
All documents and existing debate records will be added to the Round Table forum on June 1, 2026.
NATIONAL: Cleland v. Bronson — Should Improper Motive Still Be Required?
Background: In 1990, the Sixth Circuit decided Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, holding that to win an EMTALA screening claim a patient must prove the hospital was motivated by an improper motive — like the patient’s inability to pay. Every other federal circuit has rejected that requirement. EMTALA’s plain text doesn’t mention motive at all. The Crawford case is now asking the Sixth Circuit to reconsider Cleland — potentially en banc.
1: If proving improper motive requires discovery, but a court can dismiss an EMTALA screening claim before discovery occurs, does Cleland effectively make the motive requirement impossible to satisfy — and does that amount to a procedural bar disguised as a legal standard?
2: If a hospital controls all the evidence needed to prove improper motive, and Cleland allows dismissal before that evidence can be obtained, has the court handed hospitals a built-in defense that patients can never overcome?
3: When every other federal circuit disagrees with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the same federal statute, and the statute’s plain text supports the majority view, should one circuit’s 35-year-old precedent survive — and who has the authority to change it?
4: After Loper Bright eliminated Chevron deference, federal courts must interpret statutes independently rather than deferring to agencies. CMS regulations don’t include a motive requirement. Does that strengthen or weaken the case for overturning Cleland?
5: If a hospital provides a different level of screening to a paying patient than to an uninsured one, should a patient have to prove why — or should the difference in treatment speak for itself?
LOCAL: Doc. 47 — When Procedure Becomes a Trap
Background: In Case No. 3:25-cv-00516, Magistrate Judge Poplin issued Doc. 47 denying multiple motions as premature because no Rule 26(f) conference had occurred. The Crawfords — proceeding pro se — argue the order contains reversible legal error on multiple grounds. The hospital argues the order is a straightforward application of federal procedural rules.
An interesting debate happened Colleen discovered three ways to debate this document , which will be shared and could not resolve two core questions. Those questions are yours to argue, or you can come up with your own arguments in the Round Table. Here are some that will be presented:
1: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3) says a matter is admitted unless the responding party serves an answer or objection within 30 days of being served. The rule contains no language saying the clock doesn’t start until a Rule 26(f) conference occurs. If a court reads that requirement into the rule without textual support, is that a neutral application of procedure — or is it a court rewriting a rule it finds inconvenient?
2: In 2023, Federal Rule of Evidence 106 was amended to extend the rule of completeness beyond trial settings to any court proceeding. When a defendant introduces a partial document in a court filing and the opposing party invokes FRE 106 to require the complete document, does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) — a discovery timing rule — have any authority over that evidentiary right? Or, are they two different legal frameworks governing two entirely different acts?
3: The Magistrate’s footnote 1 used the phrase “to the extent this is a motion” before denying the FRE 106 request. Is conditional framing that acknowledges uncertainty about what a filing is the same as actually analyzing whether the evidentiary right it contains stands independently — or is it a blanket denial dressed in qualifying language?
4: A party has documented 1,235 days of refusal to produce records across two federal cases, mediation, statutory channels, and a federal agency complaint. Rule 37(a)(1) requires a good-faith conferral attempt before filing a discovery motion. The Advisory Committee Notes recognize a futility exception. At what point — if ever — does a documented history of refusal satisfy the futility exception, and who gets to decide when that threshold is crossed?
5: The Crawfords filed a motion to stay pending the remand ruling in October 2025. It was never granted. The court denied discovery in April 2026 because no Rule 26(f) conference had occurred. A Rule 26(f) conference cannot occur until all defendants are served. Summons has not issued because the court has not directed the clerk to issue it. If a party cannot advance a case because of a court’s own inaction — and the court then penalizes that party for failing to reach a milestone its inaction made unreachable — is that a procedural ruling or a structural denial of access to justice?